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"The Privilege To Mark Out the
Way": American Mission, Mexico,
and the Road to Santa Fe
WILLIAM B. DOLBEE

When Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1821, the Santa Fe
trade came to life. Merchant caravans began to cross the rolling plains
that separated the Missouri frontier from the villages of northern Mexico. In 1825, however, an unusual band of men set out upon this
journey. Their intent was not to trade but to survey and mark a sevenhundred-mile road from Missouri to Santa Fe, a road that had been
authorized by the United States government but would reach three
hundred miles into Mexican territory.
This remarkable undertaking appealed to American interests and
American ideals. The survey was intended to encourage the Santa Fe
trade and thereby enrich the United States. But increased commerce
between the two nations was also expected to transform Mexico. The
Mexican people were believed by Anglo-American Protestants to be
"flawed," but not inherently so. With American guidance and interaction, the Mexican people might become virtuous republicans and
William B. Dolbee received a master's degree in history from the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is currently chairman. of the history department at
Lake Forest Academy at Lake Forest, Illinois. This .project was begun at the University
of North Carolin<l with the special encouragement of Professors Michael H. Hunt and
Peter Walker. The quotation in the title of this essay is from Senator Thomas Hart Benton,
Register of Debates in Congress, Volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1825), 361.
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Mexico an ally in the fight against despotism. The survey was in part
an expression of an American sense of mission toward Mexico.
The original impetus for the survey had more to do with the economic development of Missouri than the transformation of a neighboring republic. The overland trade was of great value to the new state
as a source of furs, mules, horses, and, most importantly, gold and
silver-hard specie often in short supply on the frontier. But after only
a few seasons, the growth of the trade seemed threatened. The limited
market in New Mexico had become glutted, and merchants were finding it more difficult to dispose of their goods. It was becoming necessary
to provide a better quality and variety of merchandise at lower prices.
This meant that merchants would have to go beyond the shops of St.
Louis to the trading houses of New York and Philadelphia to acquire
their stock. To sell their goods, they would have to remain in New
Mexico through the winter or push south to more populous and prosperous provinces. These practices would require a good deal more time
and capital than could be mustered by the frontiersmen who had opened
the trade. Future growth would be in the hands of well-financed, fulltime merchants. But to such businessmen the overland trade seemed
a risky venture. The route across the plains had not been mapped or
improved in any way, Indians sometimes demanded a share of the
goods, and in Santa Fe, Mexican officials seemed to impose duties and
restrict trade according to whim. These problems would have to be
addressed by the federal government if the trade were to continue to
grow. 1
Those seeking government action were led by Missouri's pugnacious and domineering Senator Thomas Hart Benton. In 1820, the state
legislature chose the prominent St. Louis lawyer and newspaper editor
to serve as one of the state's first senators. But Benton's election had
been by the narrowest of margins--a single vote cast by a man brought
to the session on his deathbed. The new senator realized he needed
to expand his base of support from St. Louis outward to the frontier
villages of central and western Missouri. He sought a more liberal
public lands policy, worked to eliminate government control of the
Indian trade, and played a leading role in promoting the frontier commerce with Mexico. 2
1. Max L. Moorhead, New Mexico's Royal Road: Trade and Travel on the Chihuahua Trail
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 59-65; F. F. Stephens, "Missouri and
the Santa Fe Trade: Economic Effects of the Santa Fe Trade on Missouri," Missouri Historical Review 11 (April-July 1917), 295-97, 303-7.
2. William Nisbet Chambers, Old Bullion Benton: Senator from the New West, Thomas
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But Benton's interest in the trade and in the West ran deeper than
mere political expediency. Benton's life had followed America's advancing frontiers. Born in North Carolina in 1782, he journeyed with
his widowed mother to Tennessee in 1801, and then, after a scrap with
Andrew Jackson, moved on to Missouri in 1815. From the Senate,
Benton continued to look westward, but his gaze rested well beyond
Missouri. Benton believed that the developing nation required ever
larger markets, markets that were to be found in Asia, not Europe.
With access to the Pacific, the United States would be in reach of the
Orient and the health of the economy and the republic would be assured. But in the 1820s, Benton questioned whether a republic could
be preserved on a continental scale. He believed that an expanding
United States would gradually and peacefully move toward division
into several independent nations. He envisioned a number of independent republics, existing in harmony and united against despotism,
arising in North America. American access to the markets of Asia was
to be achieved through cooperation with fellow republics, not con.
quest. 3
Benton's vision of the West and of the Union would change in
later years, but in 1824 it caused him to see the overland trade in a
special light. The frontier commerce was important both as an economic
outlet for the United States and as a means for encouraging the development of republican institutions in ~exico. With these goals in
mind, Benton believed the overland trade should enjoy the encouragement of the federal government, and he set out to gain for it a
"share of the national protection."4
In 1824, one of Benton's political allies, Governor Alexander McNair
of Missouri, fired the first shot in the campaign to gain government
support for the trade. In April he sent a letter describing the trade to
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams. A month later, at the request
of Missouri's Representative John Scott, Congress petitioned President
James Monroe for all the information he had concerning the Santa Fe
trade. The House received a copy of the governor's letter-and nothing
more. s
Hart Benton, 1782-1858 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 100; Elbert B. Smith,
Magnificent Missourian: The Life of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1958),
70-71, 79-83.
3. Benton's views on the Asia market and continental expansion are expressed in
his 1825 call for the temporary occupation of Oregon,. Register of Debates in Congress.
Volume 1, 699-713.
4. Ibid., 6-7.
. 5. Annals of the Congress of the United States, Volume 42 (Washington, D.C: Gales
& Seaton, 1856), 2602, 2606; 2703-4.

230

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

JULY 1993

McNair called for the negotiation of Indian treaties guaranteeing
the merchants'safe passage to and from New Mexico. He also urged
that a diplomatic representative be placed in Santa Fe to encourage
friendly relations between Americans and both Mexicans and Indians.
By taking these actions, MeNair argued, the government would benefit
all Americans. An expanded overland trade would be a boon to the
national economy. Swift and forceful action would impress Indian tribes
with 'the power of the government. A secure overland route would
provide the most humble Americans with easy access to Mexico. And
an agent in Santa Fe, besides his official duties, would be the nation's
eyes and ears in northern Mexico. But at the top of McNair's list of
benefits was the positive effect an expanded trade would have on the
republic of Mexico. 6
In its first two years of independence, Mexico had been ruled by
Emperor Augustin de Iturbide. But in 1823 the monarchy fell and the
struggle to create a republic began. McNair argued that the United
States could and should aid this struggle by encouraging the overland
trade. An expanded trade would bring enterprising Americans into
contact with the Mexican people and would demonstrate "the blessings
of a republican system of government; blessings which the American
people wish all nations to enjoy." With the American example to guide
them, the people of Mexico would overcome their weaknesses and
become "genuine, orderly, and patriotic republicans." Thus, an expanded overland trade would not only help the United States but
would also promote the growth of republicanism in Mexico. This appeal
to both American interests and ideals would be repeated by other
supporters of the overland trade.?
Congress took no action on McNair's proposals, but when it reconvened in December the overland trade was again brought to its
attention when Benton placed before the Senate a petition signed by
"sundry inhabitants" of Missouri. Like McNair, the petitioners claimed
Indian harassment was the major obstacle to an expanded trade, They
called for treaties of safe passage and a military post on the Arkansas
River where American merchants crossed into Mexico. Should the government fail to act, the petitioners predicted a "total interruption to
the commercial and social intercourse, so happily begun between the
citizens of the two Republics." On Benton's motion, the petition was
\

6, Ibid., 2703-4,
7, Ibid,
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referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, a committee chaired by
Benton. 8
In 1825, immediately after the Christmas recess, Benton came before the Senate with yet another document concerning the trade. While
introducing the new information, Benton made a case for government
action arguing that the frontier commerce was of national significance.
Although trading caravans lurching across the plains might seem romantic, the past season had brought nearly $200,000 in gold, silver,
and furs to frontier Missouri, and this was little more than an "earnest
of what might be expected from a regulated and protected trade." Such
a trade, Benton argued, would benefit the economy of the entire nation.
The chief article of exchange, cotton goods, was grown in the South,
manufactured in the North, and exported by the West. But Benton
argued that the importance of the trade went far beyond economic
considerations. 9
To the Missouri senator, the journey of American merchants to
Santa Fe was an expression of a growing American presence throughout the world. Santa Fe was not the final destination of these merchants. Some pushed south to Chihuahua and Saltillo. Others went
southwest through Sonora to Guaymas on the Gulf of California. And
still others moved west from Santa Fe, through the mountains and on
to the Pacific. The trade with Santa Fe was no romantic curiosity but
"a new point of departure to our invincible citizens." Benton urged
the government to lend a hand to such enterprising Americans. 10
Benton then placed before the Senate an analysis of the overland
. trade more thorough and ultimately more influential than any that had
. come before. In the fall, Benton had posed twenty-two questions concerning the "origin, present state, and future prospects" of the trade
to Augustus Storrs, a Missourian who had traveled the previous summer to Santa Fe. 11
Storrs agreed that an expanded trade would serve more than the
economic interests of the United States. Mexico, according to the merchant, was a troubled nation. Its colonial heritage was one of ignorance,
isolation, and an undeveloped economy. The provinces to the south,
8. Register of Debates in Congress, Volume 1, 6-7.
9. Ibid., 109-10.
10. Ibid.
11. United States Congress, "Answers of Augustus Storrs, of Missouri, to Certain
Queries upon the Origin, Present State, and Future Prospects of Trade and Intercourse,
between Missouri and the Internal Provinces of Mexico, Propounded by the Hon. Mr.
Benton," Senate Doc. 7, 18th Cong., 2d sess., 1825, Serial 108; Register of Debates in
Congress, Volume 1, 109-10.
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with their gold and silver mines, suffered from a "superabundance of
wealth" that bred "indolence, licentiousness, and depravity." And New
Mexico was plagued by a provincial government that lacked "any just
or enlightened views of the benefits of intercourse and trade." The
strength of the new republic, though, was its people and their admiration for the United States. New Mexicans were friendly and hospitable, but most important, they embraced the tenets of American
republicanism. "Their professions of respect for our national character,
and of attachment to our principles, are universal," Storrs claimed: In
the midst of such right-thinking people, Storrs believed, the overland
trade placed perhaps the finest examples of republican energy and
ambition. "Few people have manifested more enterprise and perseverance than those engaged in this traffic," he wrote of the overland
merchants. An expanded trade would place more of these sturdy republicans before the Mexican people and would undermine Mexico's
heritage of isolation and ignorance. By encouraging the overland trade,
Storrs believed, the federal government would be advancing the "cause
of liberty in a sister republic."12
Storrs made three recommendations for government action. Like
earlier petitioners, he called for diplomatic representation in the cities
of northern Mexico and a military post on the Arkansas River. He also
urged that a road be surveyed from the Missouri frontier to the Mexican
border. Since the open plains did not present "a single hill of consequence," it was not necessary to "build" a road. Instead Storrs advised
the government to survey the most direct route that crossed streams
and rivers at passable fords and to mark that route with mounds of
dirt. By taking these actions, the government would encourage a commerce that benefited both the United States and the Mexican republic. 13
Each of Storrs' recommend.ations received prompt attention from
the federal government. In April 1825, consuls were appointed to serve
in Santa Fe, Chihuahua, and a number of other Mexican cities. Also
in 1825, the Department of War investigated the practicality of placing
a post on the Arkansas River, eventually deciding against such action.
But it was Storrs' proposed survey that received the most immediate
response. Long before Benton called for Storrs' report to be printed
and referred to his Committee on Indian Affairs, the idea of a survey
had captured the senator's imagination as a "novel and strange subject
.. asking for extraordinary legislation."14
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

14. Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years' View; or a History of the Working of the American
Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 1856),
1:41.
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Within a week Benton introduced a bill providing for the survey
and the negotiation of treaties of safe passage. But while Storrs had
called for a road only to the Mexican border, Benton's survey would
go beyond the Arkansas all the way to Santa Fe-given Mexico's permission. And while the Indians were a major concern of the merchants,
it was clear that Benton placed little emphasis on this aspect of the bill.
For the Missouri senator, the chief objective of the legislation was to
mark out a road connecting two republics. Controlling the "Arabs of
the desert" was, by comparison, a minor concern. Referring to the
venture as "my road to Mexico," Benton carefully and forcefully argued
the need for such a road and the precedents for such an undertaking. 15
According to Benton, the benefits of the road would be myriad.
It would aid a lucrative commerce with northern Mexico, an isolated
region "naturally dependent upon the valley of the Mississippi." A
permanent, well-traveled highway through the West would also help
the United States to "civilize" the Plains Indians. But the centerpiece
of Benton's argument was the effect the road would have on Mexico.
"The consolidation of their republican institutions, the improvement
of their moral and social condition, the restoration of their lost arts,
and the development of their national resources" were among the
"grand results" Benton expected the Mexican people to enjoy through
an expanded intercourse with the United States. By encouraging that
intercourse, Benton argued, the United States would free Mexico from
its Spanish heritage and would transform the young nation into an
ally of the United States. He believed the republics of the world were
engaged in a great struggle against the monarchies of Europe. The road
to Mexico would be a blow against these despots for it would "bring
together the two nations whose power and whose positions, make
them responsible to the world for the preservation of the Republican
system."
In short, Benton's road would enrich the United States, tame the
Plains Indians, and insure the "preservation of all the republics in the
world!" But the senator knew his lofty claims alone would not convince
Congress to support the bill. He also needed to show that the government had the authority to mark and survey such a road. He devoted
a third of his speech to the question of precedent. It was not unusual
for the government to protect Americans involved in foreign trade or
to conduct a survey across federal and Indian lands. But going beyond
the Arkansas was a more difficult issue. "A road upon foreign territory,"
15. Register of Debates in Congress, Volume 1, 341-48.
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Benton observed, "is a novel subject of legislation." But the Missourian
had found a precedent. A month earlier, on Christmas evening, Benton
had visited Thomas Jefferson at Monticello. There the two men talked
of the West, and eventually, as Benton recalled for his colleagues, the
conversation "turned upon roads." Jefferson told Benton of a road
authofized in 1807 that went from Athens, Georgia, to New Orleans.
The endpoints of the road were within the United States, but in between and for over two hundred miles the road passed through Spanish
west Florida. Following Jefferson's instructions, Benton found a map
of thisroad in the Library of Congress, and now, holding it high before
the Senate, he concluded with this "triumphant precedent." His road,
indeed his vision of the importance of the overland trade, seemed to
have the support of one of the republic's founders. 16
Despite the drama of Benton's presentation, some of his colleagues
proved reluctant to authorize a survey outside the United States. Senator John Chandler of Maine questioned the constitutional authority
of the government to make internal improvements let alone external
improvements. Chandler's commitment to limited government was
shared by some senators, but most believed the survey to be an appropriate undertaking. Westerners attacked Chandler arguing that the
issue at hand was not the constitutional propriety of internal or external
improvements but the responsibility of the federal government to protect citizens engaged in foreign trade. If the Senate could appropriate
$500,000 to suppress piracy in the West Indies, Senator Richard Johnson
of Kentucky argued, it could certainly spend $30,000 to secure safe
passage for western merchants.
There were other senators, though, who denied any constitutional
objections to the bill but questioned instead the propriety of "making
roads for other people." If the trade were mutually beneficial, then
Mexico should be willing to conduct its own survey. "The Mexican
government must be aware of the value of the trade," Senator John
Holmes of Maine observed, "and if they did not choose to meet us, it
would be a fair presumption that they did not want to trade with us."
On these grounds, Massachusetts Senator James Lloyd offered an
amendment to the bill limiting the survey to United States territory.
Most senators, however, rejected the argument for Mexican involvement. They believed Mexico to be in need of American assistance. "The
Mexican government," Senator William Kelly of Alabama observed, "is
in the germ of its existence, struggling with difficulties that we have
16. Ibid.
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long since surmounted." "Without intending any disrespect to the population of Mexico," Kelly argued that the Mexicans were simply "less
intelligent in commercial matters" than their American neighbors. Although the mutual advantages of a survey were apparent, the Mexicans
might fail to recognize them. Benton agreed. He claimed that the Mexicans were "blinded by ignorance" and after 150 years had yet to make
a single improvement on the road from Chihuahua to Santa Fe. Further-and perhaps more to the point-Benton observed that "it was
very easy to imagine a trade that was more beneficial to one party than
another." As the major carriers in the trade at that time, Americans,
not Mexicans, stood to profit most from a secure and direct route to
northern Mexico. From the Mexicans, Benton claimed, "We are not to
expect anything more than the privilege to mark out the way." A
majority of the Senate agreed. Lloyd's amendment to restrict the survey
was defeated.
An issue that received little attention during the debate was whether
the proposed legislation was likely to end clashes with the Indians.
Only Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina raised this question. The
elderly senator argued that treaties would have little effect on the Indians of the plains "who, as soon as they see a white man, think of
nothing but to fight and kill him." Kelly of Alabama responded that
while Indian attacks would not be eliminated by the survey and the
treaties, they would become less frequent. But for the most part, Macon's challenge to the bill raised little concern. Like Benton, most senators were more interested in uniting sister republics than in controlling
Indians. 17
The survey bill passed easily, thirty votes to twelve. Opposition
was strongest in the South-an area that consistently opposed federally
funded internal improvements. But support for the smyey came from
all parts of the country and was especially strong in the West and
Northeast. Although total government expenditures in 1825 would
amount to only $24 million, the Senate believed an appropriation of
$30,000 for the survey was justified. Even Lloyd, who had sought to
limit the survey to United States territory, supported the bill on the
final vote. Recalling Benton's forceful vision, Lloyd looked forward to
opening a channel of communication between "two of the most splendid republics in the universe."18
In February 1825 the survey bill was sent to the House of Repre17. Ibid., 355-61.
18. Ibid., 360-61. "Annual Treasury Report," Register of Debates in Congress, Volume
3 (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1829), 1586.
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sentatives accompanied by another petition from concerned Missourians and a letter from merchant Alphonso Wetmore. The petition, dated
October 1824, described a developing trade in need of government
protection, principally, guaranteed passage through Indian lands. Such
government support would benefit the entire United States economically, but more importantly, the petition claimed, it would serve to
"promote the spread of republican principles and diffusion of knowledge." Wetmore's letter, dated August 1824, offered the timely obser.vation that the "most acceptable service" the government could render
the overland merchants "would be to mark a road, so as to enable
them to pursue their operations without loss of time or distance."19
Missouri's representative, John Scott, was as eager as Wetmore
for the government to provide such a service. On March 1, as the
Eighteenth Congress was drawing to a close, Scott brought the senate
bill up for consideration. Representative George McDuffie of South
Carolina objected to such an expenditure for external improvements,
and his motion to table the bill passed by a vote of sixty-eight to fortyeight. The next day-the day Congress would adjourn-Scott again
brought the bill before the House. This time the motion of Virginia's
William McCoy to table the bill failed passage and the survey bill was
approved by the House. 2o
The bill now went to President Monroe. Monroe and Benton had
differed over such issues as the Indian trade and the occupation of
Oregon, but they were of one mind on the proposed survey. In his
final message to Congress, Monroe had held the federal government
responsible for protecting enterprising Americans abroad and assisting
the emerging republics of the Americas. The road to Mexico seemed
to serve both these goals, and on March 3, his last day in office, President Monroe signed the survey bill into law. 21
.
The differences that had existed between Monroe and Benton were
nothing compared to the antagonism between the senator and Monroe's successor in the White House. Benton had supported first Henry
Clay and then Andrew Jackson in the deadlocked presidential election
19. United States Congress, "Petition of Sundry Inhabitants of the State of Missouri,
upon the Subject of a Communication between the Said State and the Internal Provinces
of Mexico, with a Letter from Alphonso Wetmore upon the Same Subject," House Doc.
79, 18th Cong., 2d sess" Serial 116, 1-8.
20. Register of Debates in Congress, Volume 1, 735, 737, Appendix 106. The House
was meeting in the committee of the whole so there is no record of how particular
representatives voted on the survey bill or on the motions to table it.
21. Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (New York: McGrawHill, 1971), 500, 525; Register of Debates in Congress, Volume 1, Appendix, 6-8.
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of 1824. When the House chose]ohn Quincy Adams to be president,
Benton, like other Jackson supporters, set out to undermine Adams'
administration. The ill will between Adams and Benton did not, however, trouble the road to Mexico., Like Benton, Adams was committed
to the dual goal of advancing commerce and republicanism. In a statement to the Senate in 1825, Adams declared that in relations wIth Latin
America, .it was "of infinite moment that the principles of a liberal
commercial intercourse should be exhibited to them;" And in a message
to Congress later that year, Adams claimed the partially, completed
survey as an accomplishment of his administration in the areas of both
Indian relations and public works. Despite their political differences,
Adams and Benton shared a common vision of American mission in
Mexico. It was this shared vision, not any differences, that would
ultimately undermine the lofty objectives of the road to Mexico. 22
In the first two weeks of his presidency, Adams appointed three
commissioners to conduct the survey. Pierre Menard, an Illinois merchant, was unable to serve and was replaced by Thomas B. Mather,
speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives and a descendant of
Cotton Mather. Benjamin H. Reeves was also appointed. He resigned
as Missouri's lieutenant governor to take the post. The third commissioner was George C. Sibley, also of Missouri. Sibley had worked as a
government Indian trader, but recent legislation, sponsored by Benton,
had eliminated his position. Now as a survey commissioner he would
be paid eight dollars a day and would have the opportunity to investigate the potential of the overland trade. Over the next three years,
Sibley, more than Mather or Reeves, would shape the nature of the
survey,23
Charged with surveying a national road and negotiating Indian
treaties, Sibley and his colleagues carne under the supervision of Secretary of War James Barbour. Benton, however, continued to take an
interest in the project. In a letter to Sibley, Benton warned that neither
time nor money should be spared. "It is not a Countr or State Road,"
22. Chambers, Old Bullion Benton, 124-26, 128-31, 133. Smith, Magnificent Missourian, 94-95. John Quincy Adams, "American Objectives in the Panama Congress. President Adams' Message to the Senate of the United States, December 26, 1825,"in John
Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Papers and Speeches, ed. Walter
LaFeber (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), 132. Register of Debates in Congress, Volume
2, part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1826), Appendix, 4,5.
23. Kate Leila Gregg, The Road to Santa Fe: The Journals and Diaries of George Champlin
Sibley and Others Pertaining to the Surveying. and Marking of a Road from the Missouri Frontier
to the Settlements of New Mexico 1825-1827 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1952), 9-10.
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he wrote, "... but a highway between Nations, and which when once
fixed cannot be altered for Ages and Centuries to come." Like Benton,
the commissioners took little notice that they were also creating a
highway through nations: They did n()t meet with Indian leaders before
beginning the survey but chose to treat with them along the way. Two
hundred miles into their journey, the commissioners had negotiated
agreements with the Kansas and Osage tribes, distributing gifts worth
$1,600. Still two hundred miles from the Mexican border and five hundred miles from Santa Fe and with more than $18,000 remaining of the
money earmarked for the Indians, the commissioners would not again
meet with Indian leaders. They believed their time and money should
be devoted to the creation of an international highway. 24
Like Benton, the commissioners believed the road was an act of
beneficence toward a neighboring republic. Sibley had never traveled
to northern Mexico, but through contact with overland merchants had
become convinced that the people of that region were "extremely poor
and ignorant" and suffered from a "want of enterprise and industry."
But there were signs of improvement. Sibley believed that the government of New Mexico, though still "strongly biased against the proper
encouragement of a liberal intercourse," was beginning to emerge "from
its former servile state" and was "fast improving in liberal principles."
The government in Mexico City was also making rapid advances, and
Sibley was confident that it would grant permission for a survey that
"was obviously quite as much; if not more to her advantage, than to
that of the United States." Mexico was a troubled but rising republic
that would welcome the nurturing embrace of the United States. The
commissioners decided to begin their work with<;mt waiting for word
from Mexico. Surely the request for permission was a mere formality
and Mexico's approval would soon reach them on the trail. 25
But permission did not arrive, and on September 11, the survey
party made camp on the banks of the Arkansas still awaiting authorization to cross into Mexico. With winter approaching, the expedition
could not stand still for long. Reeves and Mather believed they should
return to St. Louis. Mexico"s approval should arrive by spring and the
survey could be resumed at that time. Sibley, however, argued that it
would be inefficient for the entire expedition to return to the states.
He called for the expedition to be divided into two parties, with one
24. Thomas Hart Benton to George C. Sibley, June 30, 1825, "The Journal of George
C. Sibley" and Sibley to Simpson, May 1, 1825, in ibid., 213, 57-63, 216.
25. Sibley to Simpson and "Report of the Commissioners on the Road from Missouri
to New Mexico" in ibid., 215, 199.
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returning to Missouri and the other continuing on to Santa Fe. Then,
once the Mexican government granted permission for the survey, work
could be resumed from the east and the west, thus saving- both time
and money. Reeves and Mather opposed the idea, but Sibley was determined to reach the villages of northern Mexico. After ten days,
Reeves and Mather gave in, and Sibley and eleven men crossed into
Mexico. 26
Under Sibley's direction the survey party did not go directly to
Santa Fe but instead traversed the Sangre de Cristo mountains and
went to Taos, some seventy miles to the north of the capital. Paul
Baillio, a business associate of Sibley's, lived in Taos. He met the exhausted expedition east of the mountains and provided the company
with fresh mules. In Taos, Baillio served as Sibley's interpreter. Sibley
sold the party's surplus Indian goods to him and from him purchased
a winter's supply of corn and wheat. More than a week after reaching
Taos, Sibley wrote to New Mexico Governor Antonio Narbona to notify
him of the expedition's presence in Mexican territory. Nearly a month_
passed before the American traveled to Santa Fe to present himself to
the governor. 27
Despite his unauthorized presence in the province and his delayed
appearance in Santa Fe, Sibley received a warm welcome from Narbona. Sibley had feared government hostility toward American merchants but he was happily surprised. Narbona welcomed United States
efforts to encourage a trade that was already producing $20,000 each
year in duties, and Sibley pronounced him "a gentleman of pretty good
talents" and "quite a man of business." Together they looked forward
to the approval of the survey by the government in Mexico Cityunaware that relations between the two republics were troubled. 28
Adams' choice for secretary of state, Henry Clay, had been among
the first to advocate recognition of Mexican independence and was
considered a friend of Mexico. Clay, however, soon proved how over- ,
bearing a friend can be. He provided Joel R. Poinsett, the first American
minister dispatched to Mexico, with ambitious instructions. Poinsett
was to negotiate a commercial treaty, provide for the return of runaway
slaves, assert the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and discourage
Mexican interest in Cuba. But Poinsett's most difficult assignment was
. 26. "The Journal of George C. Sibley" in ibid., 78-84.
27. "Diary of George C. Sibley," "The Journal of George C. Sibley," and Sibley to
Reeves, November 12, 1825, in ibid., 130-34, 111-19, 226-28.
28. "The Journal of George C. Sibley:' "Report of the Commissioners:' and "Diary
of George C. Sibley" in ibid., 118, 200-201, 134-39.
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to see about "regaining" Texas, and it was this objective that would
put Mexico on the defensive and jeopardize one of Poinsett's lesser
goals-gaining Mexican approval for the road to Santa Fe. 29
Clay thought it quite reasonable to negotiate a new treaty of limits
to replace the 1819 Adams-Onis Treaty signed with Spain. According
to that treaty, Texas belonged to Mexico with the United States border
running along the Sabine, Red, and Arkansas rivers. Clay suggested
that the republic of Mexico might want to negotiate its own treaty
rather than accept the boundaries set by Spain. If negotiations were
opened, the existing boundary might be altered for the benefit of both
countries. The current border, Clay argued, was too close to America's
"great Western mart," New Orleans. The border also ran through fertile
river valleys inviting confrontations once Americans and Mexicans
began to settle those valleys. To avoid these problems, Clay suggested
redrawing the border as far west as pOSSible, preferably along the Rio
Grande. By graciously taking possession of Texas, Clay reasoned, the
United States would relieve Mexico of the troublesome Indians of that
region while at the same time making Mexico's capital more centrally
located. 30
While Clay's arguments for changing the border now seem absurd,
they were considered reasonable in the 1820s by Americans who saw
themselves as providing guidance and inspiration to a newborn Mexican republic. These Americans did not believe themselves motivated
by petty self-interest but by a larger responsibility to lead and nurture
the republics of the world. Clay urged Poinsett to "show, on all occasions,an unobtrusive readiness to explain the practical operation, and
the very great advantages which appertain to our system." Mexico was
expected to welcome the guidance and advice of the United Statesand to realize that the cession of Texas was in its best interest. 31
Poinsett was an experienced diplomat with a longtime interest in
the republics of Latin America, but his mission to Mexico was a troubled
one. Mexico was suspicious of American intentions especially as they
related to Mexico's northern boundary and Texas. Mexico's Secretary
of State Lucas Alaman suggested that there be a joint exploration of
the border region before beginning any discussion of a new boundary.
Poinsett discouraged such a delay, and Alaman, perhaps with a smile,
29. Henry Clay to Joel R. Poinsett, March 26, 1825, in James F. Hopkins and Mary
W. 'M. Hargreaves, eds., The Papers of Henry Clay, 11 vols. (Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky, 1972), 4:166-77,
30, Ibid., 172-73.
31. Ibid., 175.
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countered by suggesting that in the meantime perhaps the border
should be moved east from the Sabine to the Mississippi river. Poinsett
fumed and informed Alaman that "a more advantageous boundary
might be drawn between the two countries, but that such a line was
not to be sought for east of the Sabine or north of the Red or Arkansas
rivers."32
In the midst of these discussions, the Mexican government was
reluctant to permit the United States to survey a road through Mexico's
northern frontier. Alaman argued that treaties of commerce and of
limits were needed before such a road should be marked out. But
Poinsett knew that a more fundamental concern was causing Mexico
to resist the survey. The Mexican government, he reported, had come
to regard all movements toward Texas and New Mexico with "jealous
apprehension." Clay assured Poinsett that the survey had not been
motivated by a desire for territory. Instead, Clay argued, the road
would promote a mutually beneficial trade that, if harmful at all, was
harmful to the United States because it encouraged enterprising Americans to make Mexico their home. Such claims did not allay Mexico's
concerns. Poinsett, believing the survey party to be "strictly prohibited"
from crossing the Arkansas without Mexico's permission, was convinced that Benton's road would have to wait until treaties of commerce
and of limits had been negotiated. 33
This stalemate continued until news of Sibley's journey to Santa
Fe reached Washington and Mexico City. The Mexican government
now faced a fait accompli. It could no longer refuse the survey party
entry, but must instead decide how best to return that party to the
United States. In May of 1826, Mexico's secretary of state notified
Poinsett that Sibley and his men would be permitted to "examine" that
part of the road that lay within Mexico. But while they were allowed
to survey and map the route, they were expressly forbidden from
"marking or cutting out, or establishing any works of any class what32. J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American (Durham, North Carolina: Duke
University Press, 1935), 105-6; PoJnsett to Clay, July 18, 1825, in United States Congress,
"Messages from the President of the United States, Transmitting the Information Required by a Resolution of the House of Representatives of the 13th Ultimo, Concerning
the Boundary between the United States and the Republic of Mexico," House Doc. 42,
25th Cong., 1st sess., 1837, Serial 311, 19, 23-24.
33. Lucas Alaman to Poinsett, July 20, 1825, in ibid., 20-21. Poinsett to Clay, June
22, 1825, in United States Department of State, "Despatches from U.s. Ministers to
Mexico, 1823-1906," National Archives MiCrofilm Publications (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1955), Microcopy No. 97, Roll 2. Clay to Poinsett, September 24, 1825,
in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 4:682. Poinsett to Alaman, June 17,
1825, "Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Mexico."
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soever." Adams.and Clay were ruffled by Mexico's response. They
believed a mere survey would be of little value. Sibley was less concerned. His journey across northern Mexico had convinced him that
the flat terrain marked by rock formations required little in the way of
improvements. "This very restricted permission would avail the commissioners but little indeed," he wrote Poinsett, "if it were not for the
fact that there is no 'marking or cutting out' or any 'works' necessary
or indeed practicable to be done on any part of the Road within the
Mexican Territory. ,,34
In the fall of 1826, Sibley and his men left Taos for Missouri. The
following summer Sibley made some improvements on the road within
the United States and then in October, judging his work complete,
wrote the commissioners' report and submitted it to Secretary Barbour.
The expedition's work was concluded. 35
The road received mixed reviews. In their report the commissioners claimed to have opened "a very direct and permanent highway
across the immense desert plains." The Missouri Intelligencer observed
in 1829 that the survey, at little expense, had provided the nation with
a "large and comfortable highway." And in the 1850s, Benton would
write that his road to Mexico "remained a thoroughfare of commerce."
Other observers viewed the results of the survey more critically. The
agreements with the Kansas and Osage Indians did not end theft and
harassment along the trail. Attacks by tribes farther west continued to
be a major concern of the merchants. Moreover, much of the survey
work done in Mexican territory was of little value to the merchants.
Most merchants preferred to cross the Arkansas east of Sibley's crossing
and were usually bound for Santa Fe and points south rather than
Taos. And no matter what route was surveyed in either country, the
merchants continued to vary their routes depending upon their point
of departure, changing river bottoms, and the availability of grass and
water. Experienced guides and wheel ruts would continue to be of
greater value than any surveying or marking done by the government.
In 1824, Alphonso Wetmore had recommended the survey, but in 1831
he observed, "The task was previously performed by the traders them34. Sabastian Camacho to Poinsett, May 13,1826, in ibid.; Clay to Poinsett, June 23,
1826, in Hopkins and Hargreaves, Papers of Henry Clay, 5:495-96; Sibley to Poinsett, June
18, 1826, in Gregg, The Road to Santa Fe, 234.
35. "Report of the Commissioners" and "Introduction" in Gregg, The Road to Santa
Fe, 202-3, 10.
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selves; and no advantage was derived from the expenditures of the
"~
.
money....
But while the direct benefits of the survey may have been limited,
the legislation did bring the overland trade to the attention of the
government and the nation. Congress' discussion of the trade, the
progress of the survey expedition, and the volume of trade were duly
reported by the nation's press. And the survey proved to be only the
first in a series of government efforts to encourage the overland trade.
At the time of the survey, consuls were appointed to represent American merchants in Mexican cities, and the commercial treaty ultimately
negotiated by Poinsett made specific reference to the proper regulation
of the trade. In 1827 Fort Leavenworth was established near the eastern
end of the overland route and on occasion federal troops served as
escorts for the merchant caravans. In 1845 Congress provided for the
reimbursement of duties paid on imports subsequently shipped on the
overland trail. Government assistance was accompanied by a steady
growth in the volume of the overland trade and in the amount of capital
invested by individual merchants. The total value of the trade in 1823
was estimated to have been about $12,000, with each merchant investing on average less than $500. By 1843 the trade's total value had
risen to over $400,000, with an average individual investment of over
$10,000. Under the protection of the federal government, well-financed, full-time merchants had taken the place of frontier speculators. 37
The growth of the overland trade did not, however, result in the
political developments envisioned by Benton and others. Mexico was
not transformed into a republican ally of the United States. On the
36. "Report of the Commissioners" in ibid., 205. Missouri Intelligencer quoted in
Missouri Republican, July 14, 1829, in "Notes of the Early History of the Nebraska Country,"
Publicatiol)s of Nebraska Historical Society, Volume 20 (1922): 49-50; Benton, Thirty Years'
View, 44; "Report of the Commissioners" in Gregg, The Road to Santa Fe, 231, 210; Moorhead, New Mexico's Royal Road, 68; Alphonso Wetmore, "Major Alphonso Wetmore's
Diary of a Journey to Santa Fe; 1828," ed. F. F. Stephens, Missouri Historical Review 8
(July 1914), 180.
37. Niles' Weekly Register, the most important national periodical of the day, makes
frequent references to the overland trade: Volume 26 (March to September 1824), 197,
214; Volume 27 (September 1824 to March 1825), 251, 301, 317, 318, 348, 351; Volume 28
(March to September 1825), 48, 299-300, 309, 356; Volume 29 (September 1825 to March
1826), 54, 100, 121, 127, 197, 263; Volume 30 (March to September 1826), 185; F. F.
Stephens, "Missouri and the Santa Fe Trade: Attitude of the National Government,"
Missouri Historical Review 10 (July 1916), 244-62; Moorhead,New Mexico's Royal Road, 6769; Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, ed. Max L. Moorhead (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1954); 331-33; Stephens, "Missouri and the Santa Fe Trade," 297.
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contrary, less than twenty years after completion of the survey, the
United States and Mexico were at war. Some of the sources of this
conflict were apparent in the 1820s as the Mexican republic proved to
be a less willing pupil than the United States had anticipated. Not only
did the Mexican government grant restricted permission for the survey,
but it also refused to go beyond a mere renewal of the border set by
Spain in 1819. This treaty and the commercial treaty negotiated by
Poinsett were not formally ratified by Mexico until 1832. Faced with
this seeming lack of cooperation, Poinsett came to see Mexico's leaders
as enemies of republicanism and helped to organize an opposition party
in Mexico. In 1829, tired of Poinsett's meddling, the Mexican government demanded his recall. 38
Americans sought to explain Mexico's apparent rejection of their
tutelage. Some, including Poinsett, suspected British intrigue. Others
believed that mere guidance was not enough; American occupation
was required if republicanism were to take root in Mexico. But a growing number of Americans came to believe that no matter what the
United States did, the Mexican people would prove incapable of embracing the American example. According to this view, the Mexican
people were inherently inferior and no transformation was possible.
By the 1840s, this belief in the innate inferiority of Mexicans and the
continuing assumption of American supremacy fueled the doctrine of
Manifest Destiny and justified a war of conquest. 39
Benton's road to Mexico provides insight into American attitudes
toward Mexico. By encouraging the overland trade, the United States
government intended to promote American economic interests but by
so doing also hoped to encourage the transformation of Mexico and
its people. In the 1820s Americans looked down upon the Mexicans
but did not believe their inferiority to be permanent or a justification
for expansion. Instead, Americans believed it their mission to lift the
Mexicans to a sort of equality. By serving as an example and by pro38. Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett, 120-33. In fine paternal fashion, Poinsett described Mexico's behavior as that of a "spoilt and wayward child" (Rippy, 125).
39. In Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial
Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). Horsman writes, "The
contradictions which had long been implicit in America's sense of mission became explicit
at the time of the Mexican War. It became obvious in these years that the United States
had now rejected the idea that most other peoples of the world could share in the free
government, power, and prosperity of the United States. To sow the seeds of freedom
and republicanism over an ever-widening area was not enough to secure world progress,
because Americans now believed that these seeds were falling on barren ground. Most
peoples, they believed, lacked the innate abilities to take advantage of free institutions.
Some races were doomed to permanent inferiority, some to extinction" (229). Horsman's
work has greatly influenced my approach to this topic.
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viding direction, the United States would help the Mexican people to
become virtuous republicans, their nation an ally against despotism.
When Mexico resisted the guidance of the United States, Americans
came to question Mexican potential and embrace racist assumptions.
They would have been better served had they questioned their selfserving behavior and their assumption that American values and institutions were supreme and universal.
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